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Abstract—In the last decade, there has been a growing
realization that the current Internet Protocol is reaching the limits
of its senescence. This has prompted several research efforts that
aim to design potential next-generation Internet architectures.
Named Data Networking (NDN), an instantiation of the content-
centric approach to networking, is one such effort. In contrast
with IP, NDN routers maintain a significant amount of user-
driven state. In this paper we investigate how to use this state
for covert ephemeral communication (CEC). CEC allows two
or more parties to covertly exchange ephemeral messages, i.e.,
messages that become unavailable after a certain amount of
time. Our techniques rely only on network-layer, rather than
application-layer, services. This makes our protocols robust, and
communication difficult to uncover. We show that users can build
high-bandwidth CECs exploiting features unique to NDN: in-
network caches, routers’ forwarding state and name matching
rules. We assess feasibility and performance of proposed cover
channels using a local setup and the official NDN testbed.
I. INTRODUCTION
The current IP-based Internet architecture represents an
unprecedented success story, wildly exceeding its designers’
expectations in terms of adoption, size of deployment and
scalability. Part of IP’s success is due to its light-weight design:
virtually all state used for communication is maintained at the
endpoints, rather than within the network. For this reason, IP-
based networks are – arguably, by design – extremely robust
against random failures. However, lack of in-network state
is the reason for some of IP’s shortcomings, including poor
support for efficient large-scale content distribution.
Content distribution currently accounts for most Internet
traffic [26]. Therefore, most major services [30], [17], [11],
[15] have been – for performance, cost and reliability rea-
sons [3] – relying on Content Distribution Networks (CDNs):
large, complex, geographically distributed infrastructures im-
plemented at various layers of the networking stack that
efficiently deliver content to end users. This state of affairs
motivated research into new networking architectures that can
better serve today’s Internet traffic. Named Data Networking
(NDN) [19] is one of these architectures.
NDN is an example of Content-Centric Networking (CCN).
In NDN, location-agnostic content is directly addressable by
name, regardless of who publishes it. This allows routers to
store a copy of forwarded data in a local cache, which can be
used to satisfy subsequent requests. Content is requested using
a special kind of packets, called interests. Interests are routed
similarly to IP packets; however, content is forwarded along
the reverse path traversed by the corresponding interest. Data
forwarding information is stored by routers, for a short amount
of time, in a data structure called Pending Interest Table (PIT).
User-driven soft-state on routers facilitates efficient content
distribution at the network layer. However, availability of this
state within the network creates a new set of problems. In
particular, NDN prompts new security [12], [2], [8], [27],
[9], [29] and privacy [1], [10] issues. In this paper, we
investigate whether router state can be used for covert and
ephemeral communication. We show how two parties can
secretly communicate, without directly exchanging any pack-
ets, and without injecting new content into the network (i.e.,
without publishing new data). This is a significant departure
from what can be done with IP, where lack of user-driven state
within the network forces users to rely on the application layer
for implementing covert channels.
We believe that this work is both timely and important. The
former – because of a recent surge of interest in content-centric
networking, and in NDN in particular. The latter, because, to
the best of our knowledge, it represents the first attempt to
identify and address covert ephemeral communication (CEC)
in a content-centric architecture. CEC is, in fact, relevant in
many realistic scenario, e.g.:
1) In tightly-controlled environments, where mandatory ac-
cess control is in place (e.g., in the military), CEC can be
used to exfiltrate sensitive information, possibly collected
by malware. Ephemeral nature of published data makes
subsequent forensic analysis difficult.
2) In countries with oppressive governments, civil rights
activists can covertly communicate to coordinate and
exchange information. CEC offers plausible deniability.
Studying whether CEC in NDN is possible – and how to
implement it – is an important step towards fully understanding
this means of communication, regardless of whether NDN
sees limited deployment (e.g., as an overlay on top of IP) or
widespread adoption (i.e., as a replacement for IP).
With this motivation, we design several protocols for
exchanging covert ephemeral messages (CEMs) between a
single sender and one or more receivers. We perform extensive
evaluation of our techniques on a local network and on a geo-
graphically distributed NDN testbed. Our experiments confirm
that CEC is indeed possible, and show that our techniques
provide high bandwidth and low error rate.
Organization. We present an overview of NDN in Section II.
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Section III introduces the system model. We present the delay-
based CEC mechanisms in Section IV and common-prefix-
based CEC techniques in Section V. Section VI discusses
sources of error and error handling. Experimental results are
described in Section VII. Security analysis is discussed in
Section VIII. Section IX reviews related work. We conclude
in Section X.
II. NDN OVERVIEW
In this section we present an overview of NDN. Readers
familiar with NDN may skip this section without loss of
continuity.
NDN is a networking architecture based on named data.
Data is requested via interests, and delivered in data pack-
ets [7]. Data packets include a name, a payload and a dig-
ital signature computed by the content producer.1 A name
is composed of one or more components, which have a
hierarchical structure. In NDN notation, “/” separates name
components, e.g., /cnn/politics/frontpage. Content
is delivered to consumers only upon explicit request, which
can include the full name of a particular data packet or a
prefix of such a name – e.g., /cnn/politics is a prefix
of /cnn/politics/frontpage. In case of multiple data
packets under a given name (or prefix), optional control
information can be carried within the interest to restrict desired
content. If no additional information is provided, producers
and routers return arbitrary data packets matching the request
(preferably, from a local cache).
If no local copy of a data packet is available, NDN routers
forward interests towards content producers responsible for
the requested name, using name prefixes (instead of today’s
IP address prefixes) for routing. Each NDN router maintains
a Pending Interest Table (PIT) – a lookup table contain-
ing outstanding [interest, arrival-interfaces] entries. When an
NDN router receives an interest, it first looks up its PIT
to determine whether another interest for the same name is
currently outstanding. There are three possible outcomes: (1)
If the same name is already in the router’s PIT and the
arrival interface of the present interest is already in the set of
arrival-interfaces of the corresponding PIT entry, the interest
is discarded. (2) If a PIT entry for the same name exists, yet
the arrival interface is new, the router updates the PIT entry by
adding a new interface to the set. The interest is not forwarded
further. (3) Otherwise, the router creates a new PIT entry and
forwards the present interest. We refer to (1) and (2) as PIT
hit, and to (3) as PIT miss.
Upon receipt of the interest, the producer injects a matching
data packet into the network, thus satisfying the interest. The
requested content is then forwarded towards the consumer,
traversing – in reverse – the path of the corresponding interest.
Each router on this path deletes the PIT entry corresponding
to the satisfied interest. In addition, each router caches a copy
of forwarded content in its local cache.
Unlike their IP counterparts, NDN routers can forward
interests out on multiple interfaces simultaneously. This is
done in order to maximize the chances of quickly retrieving
1Data packets also carry additional fields that are not relevant to this paper
and are therefore ignored.
requested content. A router that receives an interest for already-
cached content does not forward the interest further; it simply
returns cached content and retains no state about the interest.
Not all interests result in content being returned. If an
interest encounters either a router that cannot forward it further,
or a content producer that has no such content, no error
packets are generated. PIT entries for unsatisfied interests in
intervening routers are removed after a predefined expiration
time. The consumer can choose whether to regenerate the same
interest after a timeout.
III. SYSTEM MODEL
A CEC system involves a sender (Snd) and one or more
receivers (Rcv). Snd wants to covertly publish a time-bounded
(i.e., ephemeral) message M , while Rcv wants to retrieve it.
A time-bounded message can only be read for a given period
of time [4], after which it becomes unavailable, i.e., it expires.
Depending on the scenario, the action of retrieving a CEM
either makes it expire immediately, or “refreshes” it, hence
deferring its expiration.
Snd and Rcv are not allowed to communicate directly. For
example, the Internet provider of Snd and Rcv might monitor
all activity between its users. Moreover, Snd and Rcv are not
allowed to use services (such as email or on-line forums)
to exchange data indirectly. Snd and Rcv have access to a
producer (Pr), which is unaware of Snd and Rcv’s intent to
communicate, and only hosts content that cannot be modified
by consumers.
All packets to and from Pr are routed through an NDN
router (Rt), which caches all data packets it forwards. At first
we will assume that Rt is Snd and Rcv’s first-hop router. We
will then relax this assumption, allowing Rt to be an arbitrary
number of hops away from both. Figure 1 depicts our model.
We assume that Snd and Rcv have tightly synchronized
clocks.2 We believe that this assumption is realistic: two parties
can use NTP servers or GPS devices to synchronize their
clocks accurately, i.e., within 500 ns to a few milliseconds,
depending on the synchronization protocol [25].
Router (Rt)
Sender (Snd)
Receiver (Rcv)
Producer (Pr)NDN
Fig. 1: System model.
The adversary (Adv) has three goals: (1) detecting CEMs
from Snd to Rcv; (2) preventing Snd and Rcv from com-
municating; and (3) accessing CEMs after they expire. Adv
can monitor and modify traffic between users. Following the
retroactive privacy definition of [4], we say that a CEC system
2However, this is not required in all our protocols.
2
is secure if any efficient Adv can win the following game with
probability at most negligibly over 1/2:
1) Adv selects two same-length message M0 and M1, and
sends them to Snd.
2) Snd selects a random bit a and publishes Ma.
3) After Ma is expired, Adv tries to retrieve Ma.
4) Adv outputs its guess a′ for a; Adv wins if a′ = a.
In all the proposed CECs, after Snd has sent a CEM, it
deletes locally. Similarly, Rcv deletes all CEMs soon after
receiving them, i.e., before the messages expire. We assume
that all parties can effectively delete data.
IV. DELAY-BASED COVERT COMMUNICATION
Delay-based communication relies on the ability of Rcv to
differentiate between a cache (or PIT) hit, and a cache (PIT)
miss. Snd can exploit this by selecting a set of packets for
which it issues interests, therefore causing cache/PIT hits for
Rcv.
As a warm-up, we show how timing information can be
used to covertly transmit a single-bit CEM from Snd to Rcv.
Then, we describe how this can be efficiently extended to
CEMs of arbitrary length. To simplify our notation, we refer
to the RTT of a pair interest-data packet as the RTT of the
data packet.
A. Single-Bit Transmission via Cache
We now show how Snd sends b ∈ {0, 1} to Rcv. If b = 1,
Snd requests a data packet C. Otherwise, it does nothing. Rcv
determines the value of b by requesting the same data packet C.
If the RTT of C is below the expected RTT for non-cached data
packets, Rcv sets b′ to 1. Otherwise, b′ is 0. This mechanism
works reliably, i.e., b′ = b with overwhelming probability, if
the following conditions are met:
1) Snd and Rcv agree ahead of time on a data packet that
will be used for communicating, and when Snd will send
b.
2) C must be non-popular, i.e., it should not be in Rt’s cache
prior to Snd’s request.
3) There must be separation between the RTTs associated
with cache hits and cache misses, and Rcv must have a
good estimate for at least one of them with respect to C.
4) Rt should cache data packets for a non-negligible amount
of time.
We believe that 1 and 2 can be easily satisfied in practice. With
respect to 3, in order to distinguish a cache hit from a miss, Rcv
must determine an appropriate threshold value tthresh : iff the
RTT of C is below tthresh , then Rcv considers C as originating
from a nearby cache. tthresh can be estimated by requesting
(more than once) a large number of non- popular data packets
from the same producer that distributes C. The first interest
for each data packet will be satisfied by the producer itself. All
subsequent (closely spaced) requests for the same data packet
will come from a nearby cache. Regardless of the network
topology, there is usually a clear separation between cache
hits and cache misses (see Section VII, figures 3a and 3b)
and, therefore, also an appropriate value for tthresh .
Rcv can determine if condition 4 holds by issuing multiple
interests for data packets distributed by multiple producers,
and measuring effects (if any) of content caching. If 4 does
not hold, a different mechanism – such as the one based on
PIT – is more appropriate.
We say that a CEM exchanged by Snd and Rcv is expired
if C has been removed from all caches, or once it has been
retrieved by Rcv.
Timing Constraints. In order to receive b reliably, Rcv must
observe a set of timing constraints. In particular, Rcv’s interest
for C must be processed by Rt after C is cached (and made
available to consumers), but before C expires from the same
cache. (Without loss of generality, in the rest of the paper we
assume that data packets in Rt’s cache are available to con-
sumers as soon as they are received by the router.) Let I indi-
cate an interest for C, and [I : A→ B], [C : A→ B] the time
required to I and C to travel from A to B. Let t0 be the time
at which Snd writes b, either by issuing I (b = 1) or by doing
nothing (b = 0). Let tC = [I : Snd→ Pr] + [C : Pr→ Rt].
C is available from Rt’s cache at t0 + tC . Therefore, Rcv
can “read” b starting at tb = t0 + tC − [I : Rcv→ Rt]. When
[I : Snd→ Rt] ≈ [I : Rcv→ Rt], tb ≈ t0 + RTTRt→Pr where
RTTRt→Pr represents the RTT for C between Rt and Pr. Rcv
must retrieve b before tb+ExpRt, where ExpRt represents the
freshness field of C, or the time after which C is evicted from
Rt’s cache, whichever comes first. Figure 2a summarizes these
observations.
Time needed to read a single bit depends on the RTT
associated with a cache hit, from Rcv’s point of view. Let
RTThit and RTTmiss indicate the average RTT for a cache hit
and cache miss relative to C, as observed by Rcv. Rcv sets
b = 1 iff the RTT of C is below RTThit+∆ < RTTmiss, where
∆ is a small constant used to account for variance in C’s RTT.
Rt can therefore determine b within RTThit + ∆.
Covert messages distributed with this technique are
ephemeral, i.e., they become unavailable after a certain amount
of time without any further action from Snd or Rcv. Because
Rt caches forwarded traffic, C will eventually be evicted
from Rt’s cache. In fact, we argue that C is always a good
candidate for deletion: since C is not popular, both Least
Frequently Used (LFU) and Least Recently Used (LRU) cache
replacement policies will consider it for removal relatively
early.
Once Rcv requests C, it will be stored in cache regardless
of the original value of b. Therefore, after being retrieved, b
will be set to 1 until C is evicted from Rt’s cache.
Our experiments, reported in Section VII, show that this
technique provides high bandwidth, with low error. Moreover,
it is relatively easy to implement, since it does not require
strict time synchronization.
B. Single-Bit Transmission via PIT
In some circumstances, cache-based CEC is not applicable:
1) Rt might have no cache: small, low-cost, low-power
embedded routers may not store forwarded data packets.
2) Rt’s entire cache may be overwritten before Rcv issues
I . This can happen if Rt’s cache is very small, and the
router forwards a large amount of traffic.
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Snd
t
Rcv
[ I : Snd → Rt ] [ I : Rt → Pr ] [ C : Pr → Rt ]
[ I : Rcv → Rt ]
[Exp]
[ I : Rcv → Rt ]
(a) Cache
Snd
t
Rcv
[ I : Snd → Rt ] [ I : Rt → Pr ] [ C : Pr → Rt ]
[ I : Rcv → Rt ] [ I : Rcv → Rt ]
(b) PIT
Fig. 2: Time constrains for retrieving a CEM published using Rt’s cache (top) and PIT (bottom). The colored area delimits the
interval in which Rcv can retrieve b.
3) To prevent cache pollution attacks [9], [29], Rt may not
add to its cache data packets that are forwarded only once.
This behavior would force Snd to issue I multiple times
before C is stored in Rt’s cache, negatively affecting both
bandwidth and detectability.
4) Rt may implement cache privacy techniques that involve
delaying serving C when it is retrieved from the cache [1].
To overcome the above limitations, we design a technique
based on PIT state. This technique requires strict time syn-
chronization between parties. It is based on PIT hits (see
Section II): when Rt receives interest I ′ = I , while I is still in
Rt’s PIT, the two interests are “collapsed” within the same PIT
entry. Rt adds the incoming interface of I ′ to the PIT entry of
I , and does not propagate I ′ any further. Once C is received
by Rt, it is forwarded to the interfaces on which I and I ′ were
received.
This feature of NDN can be used by Snd and Rcv to
covertly exchange a bit b as follows. If b = 1, Snd issues
I , otherwise it does nothing. To receive b, Rcv issues I ′ = I
while a copy of I intents is still in Rt’s PIT – if originally
issued by Snd. If I is in Rt’s PIT, then Snd’s interest will be
satisfied more quickly than if it was not, because either the
original I would be already past Rt, or C would be already
on its way back to Snd. If Rcv can correctly measure the
corresponding difference in RTT, it can reliably receive b.
With this technique, we say that a CEM has expired if I
has been removed from Rt’s PIT and from all caches, or it has
been retrieved by Rcv.
Timing Constraints. While the PIT-based CEC works regard-
less of Rt’s cache behavior (or even cache availability), it
imposes much stricter timing requirements on Rcv. In fact,
I ′ must be received by Rt after I (if issued) is added to Rt’s
PIT. Moreover, I ′ must be received before C is forwarded to
by Rt. This gives to Rcv a time window of RTTRt→Pr.
As in the cache-based technique, messages exchanged via
PIT are ephemeral: if I is not issued on time, the corresponding
PIT entry will be removed once C is forwarded back to Snd.
Also, after Rcv issues I , any attempt to retrieve b within the
correct timing constraints will result in a collapsed interest
(and therefore set b = 1), regardless of the original value of b.
Figure 2b gives a graphical representation these constraints.
C. Tandem Data Packets
With geographically distributed deployments of NDN, and
when Rt is far from Rcv, RTT associated with cache hits and
misses may fluctuate significantly over time. In order to reduce
the probability of erroneously detecting cache hits/misses, we
introduce a technique – called Tandem Data Packets (TDP) –
that uses two data packets to covertly receive a single bit. To
transmit b, Snd and Rcv agree on data packets C0 and C1,
which are assumed not to be in any cache. Then, Snd requests
Cb. Rcv issue two consecutive interests, one for C0 and one
for C1; if RTT of C0 is lower than RTT of C1, Rcv sets b′ = 0,
otherwise it sets b′ = 1. The CEM is exchanged correctly if
b′ = b.
This technique does not require Rcv to make any a priori
assumption on the exact RTT associated with cache hits and
misses, besides the fact that the RTT of Cb is lower than the
RTT of C¬b. As our experiments confirm, this reduces receiver
error when, since RTT for both hits and misses is continuously
updated according to network conditions.
With this technique, after it is obtained by Rcv b becomes
inaccessible. In fact, both C0 and C1 will be stored in Rt’s
cache, due to Rcv’s interests. Therefore, any difference in
the RTT associated with C0 and C1 will not depend on b.
Therefore, b expires if it has been removed from Rt’s cache
or it has been retrieved by Rcv.
Timing Constraints. Timing constraints are identical to those
in Section IV-A.
D. Transmission of Multi-Bit Messages
Snd and Rcv may want to exchange messages composed
of more than one bit. We discuss how to determine Snd’s and
Rcv’s speed separately, since the two may send and receive at
different rates.
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Let M = b1, . . . , bn be an n-bit string. Suppose that Snd
and Rcv agree on n different data packets C1, ..., Cn. Instead
of waiting for the full RTT of C, Snd can send new Ii for
Ci before Ci−1 has been received. Snd selects an interval t;
two consecutive interests Ii, Ii+1 are sent at ti and ti+1, where
ti+1 = ti + t. The minimum value for t is denoted as tmin ,
and corresponds to sending an uninterrupted burst of interests.
Similarly, Rcv selects a value t which is used to determine
how subsequent interests are spaced. Snd and Rcv can select
t independently, as long as the timing constraints associated
with the protocol are not violated.
We evaluate how this technique affects transmission error
as a function of t and report our findings in Section VII.
Transmitting Multiple Bits with a Single Interest. For
efficiency reasons, Snd can use a generalization of the TDP
technique to send multiple bits using a single interest. Two
parties agree a priori on a set of data packets, which we
represent as a matrix:
Y =

C(1,1) · · · C(1,2m)
...
C(`,1) C(`,2m)

where m is the number of bits transmitted using one interest,
and ` = dn/me. In order to publish M , Snd splits it in
words W1, . . . ,W` of m bits each (i.e., W1 = (b1, . . . , bm),
W2 = (bm+1, . . . , b2m), etc.). Rcv then issues interests for
C(1,W1), C(2,W2), . . . , C(`,W`), where Wi is used as integer
representation of the corresponding bit string. Thus, Snd can
publish an n-bit message using dn/me interests.
To retrieve M , Rcv issues interests for all data packets in
Y . Let Ci,j be the data packet on the i-th row of Y such that
the RTT of Ci,j is the smallest across all Ci,1, . . . , Ci,2m . Rcv
sets Wi = j, and M = W1| . . . |W`. The cost of retrieving M
for Rcv is therefore exponential in m. (In practice, reasonable
values for m are between 1 and 5). Note that when m = 1,
this technique corresponds to TDP.
V. COMMON-PREFIX-BASED COVERT COMMUNICATION
Using previous techniques, a covert message can be re-
trieved only by a single receiver. Message is automatically
“deleted” after it is “read” by Rcv. This is desirable when
a CEM has only one intended recipient. However, when the
CEM has multiple recipients, Snd must create a separate
“instance” of the message for each. In this section, we propose
a technique – called Common-Prefix-Based Covert Communi-
cation (CPC) – that allows Snd to publish a message once,
and have multiple parties to retrieve it. Similarly to previous
techniques, CEMs published using CPC are ephemeral.
CPC relies on NDN’s longest prefix matching feature, in-
stead of RTT measurements. This makes it robust against cache
privacy techniques [1], which could defeat CEC techniques
introduced in Section IV.
Communication via CPC works as follows. Snd and
Rcv agree on two data packets C0, C1 which share a
common name prefix, e.g., /common/prefix/C0, and
/common/prefix/C1. 3 The common namespace is se-
lected such that data packets published under it are not popular,
i.e., not in Rt’s cache. In order to transmit a single bit, Snd
simply requests Cb. To receive b, Rcv issues an interest for
/common/prefix/. Both C0 and C1 match Rcv’s interest.
Therefore, Rt will return one data packet among C0 and C1
that is still in its cache – or in its PIT, if Snd and Rcv’s
interests are closely spaced (see timing constraints below). This
communicates b to Rcv.
This technique is very robust against changing network
conditions. In particular, since timing is not used to either
set or determine b, transient changes in RTT do not introduce
communication errors: Rcv receives only Cb, regardless of how
long it waits. Moreover, in contrast with previous techniques,
when Rcv’s interest is dropped (or, similarly Cb in response to
Rcv’s interest is dropped) Rcv can re-issue its interest, since
this process does not affect Cb.
Common-prefix-based covert channels are suitable for dis-
tributing a single message to a (possibly large) set of receivers.
Each interest for /common/prefix/ issued by a recipient
has the side-effect of “refreshing” Cb in Rt’s cache, making b
available longer. After recipients stop retrieving Cb, it “fades
away” from all involved routers’ caches, effectively erasing b.
As an alternative, Snd or one of the recipients can request C¬b
which achieves a similar result.
A message exchanged using CPC expires when it is re-
moved from all caches.
Timing Constraints. In order to successfully retrieve b, Rcv
must issue an interest for /common/prefix/ such that the
interest is received by Rt after the interest for Cb from Snd. If
the interest from Rcv is received before Cb is returned to Rcv,
communication between Snd and Rcv is implemented through
Rt’s PIT. Otherwise, Rt’s cache is used to exchange b. Snd’s
interest must also be received by Rt before Cb is removed
from the cache.
A. Multiple-Bit Transmission
Since this technique is less susceptible to RTT fluctuations
and packet loss, using it for sending and receiving multiple
bits in bursts does not introduce significant errors. This is
confirmed by our experiments, in Section VII.
Transmitting Multiple Bits with a Single Interest. Snd and
Rcv can agree on data packets in matrix Y with the additional
requirements that for i ∈ [1, `], data packets in row i share the
same common prefix pref i. Snd splits M in W1, . . . ,W`, and
– for each i – issues one interest for Ci,Wi .
Rcv needs to issue only one interest per word (i.e., per
matrix row), requesting a data packet from pref i. For this
reason, Snd and Rcv can exchange an n-bit message using
dn/me interests/data packets each.
In practice, m is limited only by availability of un-popular
namespaces containing a sufficient number of data packets.
3Common prefix can be followed by different children names-
paces, e.g., /common/prefix/foo/C0 and /common/prefix/yet
/another/prefix/C1.
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VI. ERRORS AND ERROR HANDLING
Bit errors may be introduced by both Snd (write errors)
and Rcv (read errors). Depending on the technique used
to communicate, errors may be injected in M for different
reasons and may be detected and dealt with in different ways.
A write error occurs when a data packet requested by Snd
is not added to Rt’s cache or PIT. A read errors occurs as a
result of an incorrect retrieval of a message bit after it has
been correctly written, and before it is expired.
Delay-Based: Cache. We consider the following two issues
as common causes for write errors:
1) Packet loss (either interests or data packets). Interests
from Snd may be dropped along their way to Pr.
Similarly, data packets from Pr may be dropped before
they reach Rt. In both cases, no data packets added to
Rt’s cache, and therefore the send operation fails. This,
however, can be detected by Snd, who simply re-issues
interests for which it does not receive data packets.
2) Forwarded data packets not added to Rt’s cache. This
can be caused, for example, by meta-cache algorithms
on Rt. Snd can detect this only by re-requesting all bits
set to 1 in its messages and, for each comparing the RTT
of the first request with the RTT of the second.
We identify the following causes for read errors:
1) RTT fluctuations. Since retrieving a message relies on
correctly identifying cache hits and misses, any overlap
in the RTT between Rcv and Rt and between Rcv and Pr
could cause a read error. These errors are not detectable,
and cannot be addressed by simply re-sending interests.
2) Interests from other consumers. Some consumers may re-
quest a data packet that correspond to a bit in the message
set to 0, and have it added to Rt’s cache. We assume that
this happens with negligible probability, since Snd and
Rcv exchange messages using a set of data packets that
are not popular.
3) Packet loss (data packets). If a data packet is dropped on
the path from Pr to Rt, it can be safely be re-requested by
Rcv without altering the original message. However, if it
is dropped on its way from Rt to Rcv, the corresponding
message bit will be set to 1 regardless of its original value.
Rcv can only distinguish between the two cases – and
determine the correct value of the corresponding message
bit b – when b is read as 0.
4) Packet loss (interests). When interests are dropped on
their way from Rcv to Rt (if the corresponding data packet
is in Rt’s cache) or to Pr (if it is not), Rcv cannot retrieve
the corresponding bit. In this case, Rcv can re-issue the
same interest without altering the original message, since
no data packets have been added to Rt’s cache. However,
since loss of interest cannot be distinguished from loss
of data packet, Rcv may not be able to recover from this
error.
5) Rt is rebooted. This causes all data packets in Rt’s cache
to be deleted, therefore “erasing” all messages from Snd.
This can be detected if Rcv knows that M 6= 0n.
Rcv can reduce errors induced by RTT fluctuations using
the “scope” field in interests, when Rt is its first-hop router.
This field works similarly to the IP TTL field. When scope
is set to 2, interests are forwarded for up to one hop. (Values
higher than 2 are not allowed [6]). If the Rcv’s first hop cannot
satisfy the interests, it simply drops it. This way, Rcv does
not need to measure any difference in the delay of cache
hits and misses, since only cache hits will result in returned
content. Moreover, this would allow interest retransmission in
case of packet loss, since setting scope to 2 would prevent
Rcv’s interests from adding any new content into the cache.
We argue that, however, setting the scope field would make
Rcv’s activity easier to detect.
Delay-Based: PIT. As in to the previous technique, write
errors correspond to interests sent by Snd and are not added
to Rt’s PIT. The main cause for write errors is loss of the
interest from Snd to Rt. This cannot be detected on time by
Snd, since the same interest must be issued by Rcv before the
corresponding data packet is received by Snd.
On the receiver side, errors may have the following causes:
1) RTT fluctuations. Similarly to the previous technique,
significant fluctuations of RTT can introduce read errors.
2) Packet loss (either interests or data packets). In case of
packet loss, Rcv will learn no information about the
corresponding bit in the covert message. Moreover, re-
transmitting an interest may provide no useful informa-
tion, since by then the PIT entry corresponding to the
original interest from Snd, if any, will be either expired
or removed.
3) Interests from other consumers. Other consumers may is-
sue the same interests that Snd and Rcv are using to
covertly exchange information. However, this happens
with negligible probability, because: (1) data packets used
to covertly publish messages are non-popular, and (2)
interests from other consumers must be issues a few
milliseconds before Rcv issues its interests.
4) Lack of synchronization between Snd and Rcv. Depend-
ing on the topology, Snd and Rcv must be tightly syn-
chronized, i.e., roughly within half RTT between Snd and
Pr. Lack of synchronization may lead to a high rate of
read errors.
5) Message expiration. Even though this technically is not a
read error, it may happen that Rcv cannot retrieve part of
the message on time due to the strict timing requirements.
As before, the scope field can be set in Rcv’s interest to
reduce error rate.
TDP. Write errors have the same causes, as well as detectabil-
ity, as the write errors in delay-based cache technique.
Similarly, read errors have the same causes as with delay-
based, single-bit cache. However, data packet-pairs provide
more robustness against RTT fluctuations and packet loss.
Since two subsequent RTTs – one corresponding to a cache
hit, and one for a cache miss – are measured for each message
bit, the probability of error associated with random RTT
fluctuations is greatly reduced. With respect to packet loss,
at least one of the data packets corresponding to a single
message bit will be returned with relatively high probability.
The associated RTT will still allow Rcv to estimate whether it
is coming from Rt’s cache – although less accurately.
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Common-prefix-based Covert Communication. Using this
technique, write errors may be introduced by the same events
that trigger packet loss in delay-based, single bit cache. With
respect to read errors, this technique is significantly more
robust than the previous ones because: (1) it does not rely
on timing measurements, and is therefore immune to RTT
fluctuations; and (2) in case of packet loss (affecting either
interests or data packets), Rcv can simply re-issue its interest,
without affecting the covert message.
A. Error Correction
To address potential read/write errors, Snd can use error-
correction codes with CEM. For example, Reed-Solomon error
correction codes [22] could be used. We do not investigate this
any further, since the goal of this paper is to assess feasibility
of the channel and the corresponding error rate.
VII. EVALUATION
We implemented a prototype CEC system to evaluate
our protocols. In this section we present the results of our
experiments. The prototype is based on CCNx [5], an open-
source implementation of NDN which runs as an overlay on
top of IP. We performed experiments on the two topologies:
• LAN, composed of Snd, Rcv, Rt and Pr within the same
broadcast domain. Each party runs a separate instance of
CCNx.
• NDN testbed [20], where Snd and Rcv (located in Eu-
rope) are connected to the UCLA NDN hub (which acts
as Rt), and Pr is connected to the testbed through the
UCI hub. UCLA and UCI hubs are one NDN hop apart
(ten hops over IP).
Snd and Rcv exchange 1,000-bit messages. Each message
is a fresh random bit string. This is representative of the
distribution of encrypted messages.
Naturally, our protocols generate communication overhead.
We used 41-byte interests and 377-byte data packets (on aver-
age). With single-bit transmission (either using PIT and cache),
each message bit set to 1 requires Snd to exchange 418 bytes.
Regardless of message content, Rcv needs to send/receive 418
bytes per message bit. With the TDP protocol, each message
bit costs 418 bytes to Snd and 836 bytes to Rcv. When
transmitting multiple bits with a single interest, m message
bits cost Snd 418 bytes, and 2m· 418 bytes to Rcv. Finally,
with CPC both Snd and Rcv exchange 418 bytes for each m-
bit word.
A. Evaluation of Delay-Based (Cache) Techniques
In order to assess feasibility of cache-based techniques, we
compared RTT associated with cache hits and cache misses in
both LAN and testbed scenarios.
Figure 3 summarizes our findings and represents average
values over 100,000 data packets. While there is virtually no
overlap between RTT of cache hits and misses in a controlled
(LAN) environment, RTT fluctuations on the testbed do not
always allow us to distinguish a cache hit from a cache miss.
However, the overlap is still relatively small and, as confirmed
by further experiments, it is possible to implement a reliable
CEC on the testbed.
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Fig. 3: PDF for cache hit and cache miss.
We then looked into how interest sending rate affects RTT.
We selected values for t varying from tmin = 0.3 µs to t =
5 ms (see Section IV-D). We performed several experiments,
each using 100,000 data packets. Before each experiment, we
restarted Rt in order to remove all cache entries. Results are
reported in Figure 4.
In LAN (figures 4a, 4b, and 4c), RTTs of cache hits and
cache misses are clearly separated, regardless of t. On the
testbed (figures 4d, 4e, and 4f), for small values of t, cache
hits and misses significantly overlap for messages longer than
200 bits. This suggests that short busts, separated by short
pauses, provide lower error rates.
For cache-based CEC, we evaluated read and write errors
separately, while varying t and tthresh . To evaluate write errors,
Snd published of 100,000 covert bits for each value of t. Covert
bits were subsequently requested at a low rate (t = 100 ms)
by Rcv. We then estimated how many data packets were not
retrieved from cache. Figure 5 summarizes our findings. In
this experiment, Rcv introduces a small measurement error.
We estimate to be negligible in LAN, and below 1.5% on the
testbed. With cache-based CEC, write errors can be completely
eliminated if Snd re-issues interests for content that it did not
receive; although, writing time increases.
To measure read errors, Snd published 100,000 covert bits,
separated in groups of 1,000- bit CEMs, for each value of t and
tthresh . Results of this experiment are shown in Figure 6. Due
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Fig. 4: RTT for data packets, varying request rate.
to the clear separation between RTTs associated with cache
hits and misses in LAN, read errors were very low for a wide
range of parameters (e.g., for tthresh between 1 and 1.5 ms).
On the testbed, error was typically between 3% and 5% for
tthresh between 191 and 193 ms.
B. Evaluation of Delay-Base (PIT) Techniques
We requested the same data packet from both Snd and Rcv
at very close intervals (i.e., 0.8 and 1 ms in LAN and 2 ms
on testbed), in order to trigger interest collapsing on Rt, and,
therefore, a PIT hit. Snd and Rcv were synchronized using
a local NTP server; we estimated the time difference between
the two hosts to be below 0.2 ms. Our experiments show that is
possible to distinguish PIT hits from misses using appropriate
intervals between interests from Snd and Rcv. Results of this
experiment are shown in Figure 7. However, the separation
is less clear than with cache, as shown in the same figure.
Moreover, this channel requires much tighter synchronization
between Snd and Rcv (i.e., sub-millisecond in LAN, and
within 2 ms on testbed). For these reasons, PIT-based CEC
are significantly more difficult to implement.
Since Snd and Rcv must operate synchronously and with
the same t, we measured read and write errors jointly. For this
experiment, the delay between interests from Snd and Rcv is
0.8 ms in LAN, and 8 ms on the testbed. Results are shown in
Figure 8. With appropriate choice of the threshold parameter,
errors in LAN are negligible, and below 7.5% in the testbed.
C. TDP Evaluation
We measured the error rate varying write and read speeds
separately for Snd and Rcv. Figures 9 and 10 summarize our
findings. On the receiver side, this technique performs better
than the cache-hit-based one. For example, for t = 1.5 ms in
the testbed, the error for TPD is less than 2% (see Figure 10b),
while for t = 3 (i.e., the same effective bit rate relative to the
CEM) in the cache-hit-based technique the error for is more
than 4% (Figure 5b).
D. Evaluation of Common-Prefix-Based Technique
We set m = 1 (i.e., each data packet encodes one bit),
in order to encode 1,000-bit CEM using 1,000 data packets.
We run separate experiments to evaluate Snd and Rcv errors.
As mentioned in Section VI, both parties can avoid packet-
loss-induced errors using interest retransmission. For a fair
comparison with previous protocols, we test how the common-
prefix-based technique performs without retransmissions.
Results on write errors, both in our LAN and on the testbed,
are identical to those in Figure 10. In fact, Snd performs the
same actions to send a CEM. Read errors on the testbed are
reported in Figure 11. We omit the plot corresponding to read
errors in LAN, since for all tested values of t error rate was
below 0.03%. Errors for both Snd and Rcv are due to packet
loss.
E. Bit Rate and Error Comparison
To simplify comparison of techniques introduced in this
paper, we combine effective bit rate and corresponding error
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Fig. 5: Cache-hit-based communication: write error, varying t.
for all our protocols in Figure 12. Note that, for TDP, Snd’s
effective bit rate can be multiplied by an arbitrary m, while
Rcv’s bit rate should be divided by 2m. Analogously, the bit
rate for both Snd and Rcv in the common-prefix protocol
should be multiplied by m as discussed in Section V.
VIII. SECURITY ANALYSIS
We now analyze security of CEC techniques. We start by
showing that proposed protocols are retroactively private and
secure against message recovery attack. We then conclude with
an informal discussion on the detectability and robustness of
our approaches.
A. Retroactive Privacy
Adv has non-negligible advantage over 1/2 in the retroac-
tive privacy game (see Section III) only if it can infer infor-
mation about a from interaction with Snd, Rcv and Rt after
the message Ma has expired. That is, Adv can only interact
with protocol participants after data packets used to encode
Ma have been removed from Rt’s PIT and from all caches.
Since Snd and Rcv delete Ma as soon as they (respectively)
send and receive it, Adv cannot acquire information about Ma
by compromising the two parties. Similarly, NDN routers do
not keep track of data packets once they disappear from both
PIT and cache. Therefore, after Ma expires, Rt carries no
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Fig. 6: Cache-hit-based communication: read error varying
tthresh and t.
information about the message. As a result, there is simply no
information about Ma within the network after the message
expires.
B. Security Against Message-Recovery Attacks
In order to reconstruct a CEM, Adv can probe all NDN
routers, and try to identify data packets used for covert
communication. However, this approach has two problems:
(1) there is no data packet in routers caches for a bit set to
0; therefore, Adv cannot learn information about these bits by
simply observing routers caches. (2) even for a relatively small
NDN deployment, the number of routers and the size of their
caches makes this attack infeasible.
Another adversarial strategy consists in infiltration of the
routing infrastructure: Adv could mount a Sybil attack [28],
deploying a large number of malicious NDN routers. We
believe that this approach is not feasible, since: (1) Adv cannot
deploy an arbitrary number of NDN routers. Even if NDN
is implemented as an overlay, routers are identified by their
unique IP address. This would force Adv to obtain a very large
number of public IP address. (2) Even if the adversary succeeds
deploying a large number of routers, it must log all data packets
forwarded by all controlled routers. This may not be feasible.
(3) Similarly, even if Adv can compromise arbitrary routers,
maintaining logs for all forwarded data packets would not be
viable.
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Fig. 12: Performance comparison.
C. Detectability
In order to exchange a message through our protocols, Snd
and Rcv do not need to communicate directly, nor they need
to be connected through the same NDN router. Moreover,
they only interact with the network as prescribed by NDN
specifications.
A single-bit message b = 0 sent using single-bit transmis-
sion via cache or PIT cannot be detected, since Snd performs
no action. When b = 1, Snd retrieves a non-popular data
packet. We believe that, in practice, by flagging all single
interests for non-popular data packets as “suspicious”, Adv
would incur in an overwhelmingly large number of false
alarms. Similarly, a single interest issued by Rcv to retrieve
b would be easily hidden by the existing traffic.
When Snd and Rcv exchange messages longer than a
single bit, however, their actions become more detectable. In
particular, the longer the message, the more likely it is for
Adv to correctly identify a CEM between two or more parties.
While a single interest for non-popular data packets may not
raise any suspect, a long streak of interests for non-popular
data packets may be easy to notice. For this reason, Snd and
Rcv should limit the size of the exchanged messages to reduce
detectability.
Finally, with namespace-based covert communication de-
tectability mostly depends on m and on the size of the covert.
In particular, a higher value for m implies lower detectability:
less data packets have to be requested to write and read a
covert message.
D. Robustness
When Rt introduces arbitrary delays to conceal cache hits,
our techniques based on measuring time difference between
these two events do not work. However, techniques based on
PIT and on common prefixes are not affected by cache hit
delays, since they either do not rely on cache or do not consider
RTT.
Similarly, when the network introduces unpredictable de-
lays on packets (e.g., when traffic intensity has sudden wide
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Fig. 7: RTT for data packets causing PIT collisions.
fluctuations), common-prefix-based technique may be more
appropriate since it does not rely on timing measurements.
IX. RELATED WORK
We divide relevant related work in two classes: covert
communication and ephemeral communication.
Covert Communication. The goal of a covert channel is to
conceal the very existence of a covert message by communi-
cating it through legitimate channels [16].
In [24], Shah et al. present Jitterbug, a hardware device and
a communication protocol that covertly transmit data by per-
turbing the timing of keyboard events. In particular, the authors
design and implement a small hardware pass-through device
that introduces small – although, measurable – variations in
the times at which keyboard events are delivered to the host.
When the user runs an interactive communication protocol
(e.g., SSH, instant messaging), a receiver monitoring the host’s
network traffic can recover the leaked data. According to the
experimental results reported in [24], the bandwidth offered
by Jitterbug is roughly 500 bps over 14 network hops, with
8.9% error rate. In contrast, our technique provide a bit rate
of about 15,000 bps in a similar scenario with analogous error
rate. Another difference is that with Jitterbug the receiver must
be able to intercept network traffic, while our approach can be
used by any unprivileged user.
 0
 10
 20
 30
 40
 50
 0.5  1  1.5  2  2.5  3
e
rr
o
r 
(%
)
tthresh (ms)
t=1 ms
t=3 ms
t=5 ms
(a) LAN
 0
 10
 20
 30
 40
 50
 203  204  205  206  207  208  209  210
e
rr
o
r 
(%
)
tthresh (ms)
t=1 ms
t=3 ms
t=5 ms
(b) Testbed
Fig. 8: Joint write and read error varying t in our PIT hit-based
protocol.
CoCo, introduced in [16] by Houmansadr et al., is a
framework for establishing covert channels via inter-packet
delays. The sender generates a traffic flow directed to the
receiver, then manipulates the flow according to the covert
message and a key, shared between the two parties. The
coding algorithm used in CoCo ensures robustness of the
covert message to perturbations. The authors show statistical
evidence on the undetectability of the communication channel.
We emphasize that CoCo would not satisfy our requirements
because sender and receiver must communicate directly.
Murdoch et al. [18] investigate covert channel implemented
by embedding information in random-looking TCP fields. They
show that naı¨ve approaches – such as embedding ciphertext
in the initial sequence number (ISN) field – can be easily
detected. Then, they discuss how to implement networking
stack-specific covert channel, which are provably undetectable.
Similarly to CoCo, the main difference between our work and
the work of Murdoch et al. is that sender and receiver must
exchange packets directly.
Ephemeral Communication. Geambasu et al. introduced the
Vanish system [14], which allows users to publish ephemeral
messages. Users encrypt their messages using a random sym-
metric key. Then, they publish shares of the key (computed
using Shamir secret sharing [23]) in random indices in a
large, pre-existing distributed hash table (DHT). A DHT is
a distributed data structure that holds key-value pairs. Since
data on DHTs is automatically deleted over time, shares of
the key automatically “disappear”. Once enough shares have
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Fig. 9: Write error with TDP, varying Snd’s t.
been deleted, the key – and therefore the encrypted message
– is effectively erased.
Wolchok et al. [28] showed that Vanish can be defeated
using low-cost Sybil attacks on the DHT. In particular, they
exploited one of the design flaws of Vanish, namely the
assumption that DHTs are resistant to crawling. This is in
contrast with our approach, where monitoring all routers’
caches is clearly infeasible. Although the authors of Vanish
have since proposed countermeasures [13], these techniques
only slightly raise the bar against existing attacks [4].
Castelluccia et al. [4] introduced EphPub, a DNS-based
ephemeral communication technique. A publishers encrypts
and distributes a message. Then, it distributes the decryption
key as follows: for each key bit set to 1, the publisher picks a
DNS resolver and uses it to answer a recursive DNS queries
for a specific domain. Since DNS resolvers cache responses for
a pre-determined amount of time, one or more receivers can
subsequently issue non-recoursive queries to the same resolver.
These queries will be answered only if the corresponding
domain-IP pair is in cache. Once enough cache entries expire
(or get overwritten), the decryption key – and therefore the
published message – disappears.
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Fig. 10: Read error with TDP, varying Rcv’s t.
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Fig. 11: Common-prefix-based protocol: read error varying t.
There are several differences between EphPub and our
techniques. First, while EphPub relies on an application-layer
service (DNS resolver) to publish an ephemeral piece of data,
our techniques leverage routers’ PITs and caches, which are
part of the routing architecture. Moreover, while EphPub can
be blocked by forcing users to use a local DNS server with
no cache (e.g., by filtering out DNS queries at the network
gateway), our PIT-based technique allows two parties to ex-
change CEMs even if routers do not provide content caching.
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Moreover, if EphPub sees wide adoption, there are several
concerns (raised also by Castelluccia et al. in [4]) that would
impose excessive load on DNS servers, which would then be
forced to stop acting as “open” resolvers. In contrast, with our
approach, communicating parties do not impose higher-than-
usual load on routers: consumers simply use their allocated
bandwidth for content retrieval. Furthermore, routers cannot
determine the source of data requests (interests do not carry a
source address), and therefore always operate similarly to open
resolvers. Finally, EphPub does not provides covert communi-
cation, since the behavior of two users who communicate via
EphPub is difficult to conceal. In fact, “regular” users rarely
query multiple remote DNS servers in short bursts. With our
techniques, instead, Snd and Rcv do not perform any easily
identifiable activity.
Perlman [21] proposed Ephemerizer, a centralized approach
to secure data deletion. The goal of Ephemerizer is to find a
balance between data availability and the ability to properly
delete data. Users encrypt their data using a symmetric encryp-
tion scheme. Then they delegate key storage to a trusted third
party. This third party destroys cryptographic keys when they
“expire”, effectively making the original data unaccessible.
Compared to [14], [4], as well as to our approach, Ephemerizer
requires an always on-line, trusted third party.
X. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we have presented the first evaluation of
covert ephemeral communication in NDN. Our techniques do
not require Snd and Rcv to exchange any packet directly.
Rather, they rely on user-driven state on routers to publish
and retrieve covert messages. Messages published with our
approach are ephemeral, i.e., they are automatically deleted
from the network after a certain amount of time, without
requiring any action from Snd or Rcv. Additionally, our delay-
based techniques, messages expire immediately after being
retrieved.
Our techniques are based on fundamental components
on NDN, and do not require “abuse” of application-layer
protocols. In practice Snd and Rcv only need access to non-
popular content.
We performed experiments on a prototype implementation
of our protocols. In particular, we measured the the bandwidth
and robustness of our approaches on a local (LAN) setup and
in a geographically distributed environment – the official NDN
testbed. Our experiments confirm that the techniques proposed
in this paper provide high bandwidth and low error rate.
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